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Motivation
Motivation
Honesty and beliefs on honesty are central in many economic and social
interactions
• Underestimating honesty :
⇒ Useless and costly control of population
⇒ Self deprivation of value added services
• Overestimating honesty :
⇒ Creation of non-efficient exchange
⇒ Emergence of non-efficient actors
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State of the art
Existing literature and contributions
• Standard trust game of Berg et al. (1995)
⇒ lacks normative rule and includes money exchange implying
inequality aversion and altruism effects. Trust 6= Beliefs on Honesty
• Cohn et al. (2015)
⇒ honesty based on a deviation from a normative rule
• Galeotti et al. (2017)
⇒ take into account diversity on players’ environment. Nothing
about beliefs on honesty
• Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013); Hugh-Jones (2016)
⇒ experiment on both sides: honesty and beliefs on honesty. But
analysis only at aggregated level
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Experimental procedure
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Procedure
Experimental procedure
• Elicitation of attitudes towards risky decisions in the gain and loss
domains (Holt and Laury, 2002)
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Results
• The average deviation of B is 0.97 euros. Over the 40 B subjects 19,
or 47%, respect the rule and 14, or 35%, fully deviate.
• The average deviation expectation of A is 0.48 euros (significantly
lowest than effective deviation – p − value < 0.001). Over the 177 A
subjects 27, or 15%, believe in other’s honesty and 104, or 59%, don’t
believe in others’ honesty.
• Interestingly, results highly depend on draws’ conditions. Reminding
us Fehr et al. (1992) and more recently Galeotti et al. (2017) results
where subjects who are paid more are more likely to reciprocate by
shirking less.
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Results
For the following econometric regression we define:
Ai ,t = f (Xi ;Xt)× RBt + εi ,t
Where Ai ,t is the answer of subject i for draw t, f (Xi ,Xt) is a linear
combination of individual (Xi ) and draw (Xt) explanatory variables and
RBt , is the ammount allowed to be taken under the rule.
Hence, E (f (Xi ,Xt)) = 1 means that subject i fully believes in others
honesty. However, when E (f (Xi ,Xt)) decreases, it means that subject i
has lowest expectations with respect to others honesty.
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Conclusion
Implications
I A new metric easy to implement to control honesty effect in many economic
relationships
I Overestimation of honesty can support the presence of inefficient intermedi-
aries such as insurance brokers
I Distortion of beliefs provides evidence of the importance of environment
Challenges
I Investigate relationship between trust and honesty
I Find new applications outside of the insurance field
I Improve the study of distortion effect using new variables
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Next Steps
New experiment in progress
I Increase number of observations in particular for honesty behaviors
I Elicitate beliefs and honesty of a same individual
I Control order effects (within design)
I Test new unfavorable and favorable conditions
I Control hypothetical biases
I Application to fraud behaviors
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Thank you for your attention
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